Knapsack-type cryptosystems were among the first public-key cryptographic schemes to be invented. Their NP-completeness nature and the high speed in encryption/decryption made them very attractive. However, these cryptosystems were shown to be vulnerable to the low-density subset-sum attacks or some key-recovery attacks. In this paper, additive knapsack-type public-key cryptography is reconsidered. We propose a knapsack-type public-key cryptosystem by introducing an easy quadratic compact knapsack problem. The system uses the Chinese remainder theorem to disguise the easy knapsack sequence. The encryption function of the system is nonlinear about the message vector. Under the relinearization attack model, the system enjoys a high density. We show that the knapsack cryptosystem is secure against the low-density subset-sum attacks by observing that the underlying compact knapsack problem has exponentially many solutions. It is shown that the proposed cryptosystem is also secure against some brute-force attacks and some known key-recovery attacks including the simultaneous Diophantine approximation attack and the orthogonal lattice attack.
Introduction
Knapsack cryptography [1] is an important class of public-key cryptosystems in the area of public-key cryptography. It involves no expensive modular exponentiations, which makes the encryption and decryption much more efficient than discrete-logarithm-based and factorization-based cryptosystems [2, 3] . For a long time, knapsack-type cryptosystems were considered to be the most attractive and the most promising due to their high speed of encryption and decryption and NP-completeness nature. Many knapsack-type cryptosystems were developed in the history of knapsack public-key cryptography especially in the 1980s, and the cryptographic applications of some variants of the knapsack problem were also investigated [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . However, almost all additive knapsack-type cryptosystems were shown to be vulnerable to lowdensity subset-sum attacks [15] [16] [17] , GCD attack [18] , simultaneous Diophantine approximation attack [19, 20] or orthogonal lattice attack [21] . Refer to the survey paper [22] for the rise and fall of knapsack cryptosystems.
Several methods have been used to design knapsack cryptosystems achieving high density, especially non-injective cryptosystems with density greater than 1. One method is due to Koskinen [23] and another one is due to Chor, Rivest [24] , and Okamoto et al. [25] . However, the two knapsack cryptosystems given in [23] suffer a drawback that the decryption is timeconsuming, while the so-called low-weight knapsack cryptosystems Chor-Rivest [24] and Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama [25] were also shown to be vulnerable to low-density attacks [26] [27] [28] [29] . This paper defines a new easy quadratic compact knapsack problem. We construct a new knapsack-type public-key cryptosystem based on the knapsack problem. The cryptosystem achieves a high knapsack density (about 1.27 when the dimension of the public cargo vector n = 100) under the relinearization attack model. However, the security of the knapsack cryptosystem against low-density subset-sum attacks is not supported by the estimation of the density. We show that the underlying compact knapsack problem always has exponentially many solutions. Hence, it is completely computationally infeasible for the attacker to find all the solutions among which the attacker expects to pick out the plaintext. Thus, we show that the system is secure against the low-density subset-sum attacks. We also show that the system is secure against simultaneous Diophantine approximation and orthogonal lattice attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lists some useful concepts to understand the security analysis. In Section 3, we define an easy quadratic knapsack problem. The detailed description of the proposed cryptosystem is given in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the performance related issues and specifies the parameter selection. Section 6 analyzes the security of the proposed cryptosystem. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
We recall some concepts about the lattice theory, the low-density subset-sum attack and the simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem. These concepts are useful to understand the security analysis of the proposed cryptosystem.
Notations
Throughout this paper, the following notations will be used. The greatest common divisor of two integers a and b is denoted as gcd(a, b). For (a, b) ∈ Z + 2 , and an integer m, m mod (a, b) denotes the 2-tuple (m mod a, m mod b). Naturally, u ≡ v(mod(a, b)) means that u mod a = v mod a or u mod b = v mod b. When x is a number, |x| means its absolute value. For an n-dimensional vector X ∈ R n , we write X for the Euclidean norm of X . The notation |A| denotes the cardinality of a set A. We write the binary length of an integer a as |a| 2 . r denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to r.
Definition of lattice
A lattice is a discrete (additive) subgroup of R n . More precisely, a lattice consists of all integral linear combinations of a set of linearly independent vectors {v i }, i.e.,
The most important algorithmic problems in lattice theory include the shortest vector problem (SVP), the closest vector problem (CVP) and the smallest basis problem (SBP). The SVP is to search for the shortest non-zero vector in a given lattice L. The CVP states that, given a lattice L and a vector v, find a lattice vector s minimizing the length of the vector v − s. The SBP requires one to find a lattice basis to minimize the maximum of the lengths of its elements in a given lattice. No polynomialtime algorithm is known for the three problems. The best polynomial-time algorithms for solving SVP achieve only slightly sub-exponential factors, and are based on the LLL algorithm [30] . These problems are of special significance in complexity theory and cryptology.
Knapsack problems and density
The standard subset sum or 0-1 knapsack problem is defined as follows. Given a cargo vector A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and a sum s, find which elements are put into the knapsack, that is, solve the following linear Diophantine equation for the binary
(1)
The standard 0-1 knapsack problem has many variants. One of these variants is compact knapsack problem which given A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and s, asks for X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) with 0
Another problem is quadratic knapsack or matrix cover problem which needs to solve a 0-1 quadratic Diophantine equation s = XAX T , where X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), x i ∈ {0, 1}, and A is an n-dimensional square matrix. These problems had been used to construct knapsacktype public-key cryptosystems [1, 4, 31, 9, 14] . In this paper, we will define a new knapsack problem, simultaneous quadratic compact knapsack problem.
In a compact knapsack cryptosystem with public key A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ),
An important characteristic of a knapsack cryptosystem is the density of the cryptosystem. The density for compact knapsack problems (2) is defined as d = nb/ log 2 max 1≤i≤n a i [32] , where we set b = log 2 (k + 1) in that b bits are needed to represent the k + 1 integers in [0, k] . We note that when b = 1, the definition immediately gives the density for 0-1 knapsack problems (1), d = n/ log 2 max 1≤i≤n a i [17, 16] . Here we also point out that some other definitions appear in the literature for the density of compact knapsack problems (2) . For example, Katayangi and Murakami defined the density of [33] . In fact, when n approaches infinity, the two definitions are asymptotically identical.
Low-density subset-sum attacks
The basic idea of low-density attacks is to solve the knapsack problem with lattice basis reduction algorithms. Given a cargo vector A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and a sum s = n i=1 a i x i , the Lagarias-Odlyzko low-density attack [16] is outlined as follows. Construct the following matrix
The integral combinations of the row vectors {v i } of the matrix V imply an (n [17] . The authors of [17] also derived a better bound 0.9408 by introducing two different lattices, which we will not detail in this paper. The above bounds only apply to 0-1 knapsack problems. For compact knapsack problems (2), Lee and Park set δ > k √ n and argued that when b = log 2 (k + 1) is much larger than n and if d < 1, the compact knapsack problem is almost always solvable with a single call to a lattice oracle [32] .
However, as far as the authors know, no general results are obtained for compact knapsack problems (2).
Simultaneous Diophantine approximation
The simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem states that, given n + 1 real numbers r 1 , . . . , r n , ε > 0, and an integer Q > 0, find integers p 1 , . . . , p n , and q such that 0 < q ≤ Q , and
There exists a solution to the simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem if Q ≥ ε −n . However, no efficient algorithm is known to find the solution. This problem is also related to lattice basis reduction and the solution can be approximated with lattice basis reduction algorithms.
We illustrate the reduction in a bit more details. Similarly to the above low-density subset-sum attack, the key point is to find a lattice to represent the simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem. Note that the integral linear combinations of the row vectors of the following matrix form a lattice L,
One can employ lattice basis reduction algorithms and obtain a reduced basis of the lattice L. The shortest vector b in the reduced basis can be used to solve the simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem. Since b ∈ L, there exist integers p 1 , . . . , p n, and q such that
Because b is short, p i − qr i is small for i = 1, . . . , n. Hence, |r i − p i /q| is small for each i = 1, . . . , n. From the discussion above, the set of fractions {p i /q} with a common denominator q is approximate to {r i }. This observation illustrates the relation between the lattice reduction algorithms and the simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem.
An easy simultaneous quadratic knapsack problem
Knapsack cryptosystems are always constructed by finding an easy knapsack problem and then transforming this easy knapsack into a seemingly hard knapsack problem. In this section, we give an easy quadratic knapsack problem. The cargo vector defined in the easy knapsack problem is different from the super-increasing sequences [1] , the cargo vectors used in Graham-Shamir cryptosystem [34] , and the knapsack sequences [35] used for attacking a knapsack-type cryptosystem [12] based on Diophantine equations, and it can be thought as the generalization of the cargo vectors given in [31, 14] .
Now we consider two sets
Generally, we have ∀j ∈ J, |I mod j| ≤ |I|. It is easy to see that |I mod j| = |I| if and only if different integers in I modulo j always produce different integer pairs, i.e., ∀i 1 = i 2 ∈ I,
More concretely, we set I = {i 2 |i = 0, 1, . . . , 15} and J = W ∪ W T , where W is a set consisting of the following integer pairs: (1, 31) , (1, 34) , (1, 37) , (1, 38) , (1, 41) , (1, 43) , (1, 46) , (1, 47) , (1, 53) , (1, 58) , (1, 59) , (1, 61) , (1, 62) , (1, 67) , (1, 68) , (1, 71) , (1, 73) , (1, 74) , (1, 76) , (1, 78) , (1, 79) , (1, 82) , (1, 83) , (1, 86) , (1, 87) , (1, 89) , (1, 92) , (1, 93) , (1, 94) , (1, 97) , (2, 17) , (2, 19) , (2, 23) , (2, 29) , (2, 31) , (2, 34) , (2, 37) , (2, 38) , (2, 39) , (2, 41) , (2, 43) , (2, 46) , (2, 47) , (3, 26) , (3, 29) , (3, 31) , (4, 17) , (4, 19) , (4, 23) , (6, 13) . It is easy but tedious to verify that I is DIST modulo J. Take (3, 31) , (17, 2) ∈ J as an example. We compute I mod (3, 31) as a table
Hence, both cardinalities of I mod (3, 31) and I mod (17, 2) equal to |I| = 16. Definition 1 also says that if I is DIST modulo J, given j and i 2 mod j, we can uniquely determine the integer i. For example, given i 2 mod (3, 31) = (0, 5), from the table generated via I mod (3, 31), we look up the table and find that the 6th component matches (0, 5) (starting from the 0th entry (0,0)), so we can uniquely determine i
= 81, i = 9. In fact, J contains all the 100 integer pairs j = (j 1 , j 2 ) with j 1 j 2 < 100 such that I is DIST modulo J. We also should note that for any non-empty subset G of J, I is also DIST modulo G.
In the rest of the paper, we always use I and J to denote the set I = {i 2 |i = 0, 1, . . . , 15} and the set containing the 100
integer pairs respectively. Now we look at an example. We summarize the results shown in the example using a theorem.
Theorem 1. Given two cargo vectors
A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and B = (b 1 , . . .
, b n ). Denote by c i and d i the gcd of the latter i components of A and B respectively, i.e., c i
can be solved in polynomial (about n) time. Furthermore, the problem has at most one solution about X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) with x i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 15}.
Proof. The following facts are obvious. Firstly, I is DIST modulo G. Hence, given g i and an integer pair (a, b) belonging to the table generated via I modulo g i , we can determine a unique x i such that
Assume that (3) has solutions. We use mathematical induction to prove that we can solve (3).
The two equations of (3) modulo c n−1 and d n−1 respectively give a 1 x
1 s 2 ) mod g n , from which we uniquely determine x 2 1 ∈ I and hence the value of x 1 ∈ {0, . . . , 15}. We assume that the values of x 1 , . . . ,
Note that the two equations of (4) modulo c n−i−1 and d n−i−1 respectively give
, from which we can uniquely determine x 2 i+1 modulo g n−i and hence the value of x i+1 ,
After the values of x 1 , . . . , x n−1 have been determined, we get two equations a n x
Hence, we also can uniquely determine x n ∈ {0, . . . , 15}.
If and only if one of the following cases appears, we conclude that (3) . . , x n can be uniquely determined, but they cannot match the equations of (3) simultaneously.
To determine each x i , we need to solve two linear congruences and look up the table generated via I mod g n−i+1 . So the simultaneous quadratic knapsack problem (3) can be solved in polynomial (about n) time. If the problem has solutions, each x i is uniquely determined. So the simultaneous quadratic knapsack problem has at most one solution.
For given input A, B subject to the requirements of Theorem 1 and s 1 , s 2 , the algorithm to solve (3) runs as follows. Now we begin to construct a public-key cryptosystem in the next section by using the above easy knapsack problem.
The proposed cryptosystem
The proposed asymmetric encryption algorithm consists of three sub-algorithms: key generation, encryption and decryption.
Key generation
The key generation algorithm runs as follows. A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) which satisfy the requirements of Theorem 1. 
Randomly choose two cargo vectors
6. Randomly choose an invertible integer v over Z N .
Compute
• Secret key: N, p, q, C −1 , and v −1 mod N;
• Public key: F .
Remark 1.
In fact, to decrypt a given ciphertext, we also need to compute and store the values of c i = gcd(a n , . . . , a n−i+1 ),
. . , n}, and n − 1 tables generated via I mod g i for i = 2, . . . , n. However, these values are easily computed from the public and secret keys. As in other knapsack cryptosystems, the public cargo vector F can be permutated and re-indexed for increased security.
We use Algorithm 2 to generate two cargo vectors A and B satisfying the requirements of Theorem 1. 
4. Output A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ), and exit.
We prove that the generated vectors A and B really satisfy the requirement of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. The generated vectors A and B satisfy the requirements of Theorem 1.
Proof. Denote c i and d i as the gcd of the latter i components of A and B respectively. Hence, we only need to show that for
It is easy to verify that
So for i = 2, . . . , n − 1, we have
as desired.
Encryption
The message M = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) with |m i | 2 = 4, i.e., m i ∈ {0, . . . , 15}, is encrypted into,
Decryption
To decipher a ciphertext c, the receiver does the followings.
Compute
t ≡ cv −1 ≡ n i=1 e i m 2 i (mod N) .(8)
Compute t p ≡ t(mod p), t q ≡ t(mod q), and (s A , s B )
3. Solve the following simultaneous quadratic compact knapsack problem to recover the plaintext by using Algorithm 1,
Why decryption works?
We show how to recover the plaintext by solving the quadratic compact knapsack problem (7) according to the knowledge of the secret key and Algorithm 1. From (8) and (5) 
that is, (9) . According to Theorem 1, this is a simultaneous quadratic compact knapsack problem, and can be efficiently solved by using Algorithm 1.
Suggested parameters and performance

Suggested parameters
We should choose p and q slightly greater than 225 So,
In implementation, n = 100 is suggested. We recommend to choose C as
.
We note that the recommended parameter n = 100 happens to be identical to the cardinality of J, |J| = 100. However, this does not mean we cannot choose a larger n. In fact, we have stated in the first step of Algorithm 2 that the n − 1 integer pairs g i = (g 1i , g 2i ) ∈ J for i = 2, . . . , n are generated with repetition permitted. Hence, we can choose as many g i 's as we want. If repetitions were not permitted, we only can generate at most |J| = 100 g i 's, and hence n is at most |J| + 1 = 101. If n > 101, there must exist a g i ∈ J that is chosen at least two times. We recommend n = 100 mainly due to security considerations. In Section 6.1, we show that when n = 100, the attacker needs to perform n16 n/2 ≈ 2 206.6 operations to recover the plaintext. In Section 6.2, we show that for a ciphertext, there are about 2 151 preimages. So we think that n = 100 is sufficient to obtain a high level of security.
Public-key size
We first assume that the randomly chosen g i = (g 1i , g 2i ) is uniformly distributed over J. Hence, the expected value for g 1i g 2i should be the geometric mean of all the 100 products g 1i g 2i , which is about
(w 1 ,w 2 )∈W w 1 w 2 ≈ 60.86. (10) The binary length of the public key of the proposed cryptosystem is
Note that
2 n 2 60.86
So the binary length of N is |N| 2 = (n − 1)|60.86| 2 + 2|225n| 2 , which is bounded by O(n). The public-key size is about 100|225 2 n 2 60.86 n−1 | 2 ≈ 6157 bits when n = 100.
Information rate
The information rate defined as the ratio of the binary length of the message to that of the ciphertext of the proposed cryptosystem is ρ = 4n/ log 2 C max . Note that
So the information rate is evaluated by ρ ≈ 4n/ log 2 (225 3 n 3 60.86
n−1 ). When n = 100, the information rate is about 0.63.
Computational complexity
The encryption of the cryptosystem only performs O(n) multiplication and addition operations. The binary lengths of the involved integers are bounded by O(n) and O(1) respectively, so the complexity of the encryption is O(n
Security analysis
Like all the other knapsack cryptosystems, our system does not match the provable security goals, either. In this section, we only discuss some known attacks on the proposed cryptosystem. However, we do not consider some specialized attacks such as Shamir's attack [36] on the basic Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem [1] to recover the super-increasing sequences and Vaudenay's algebraic attack [37] on the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem [24] .
On solving the quadratic compact knapsack problem
One straightforward way to break the system is to solve (7) for M = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) . The attacker can exhaust n/2 steps [22] . For a sufficiently large parameter n, the attack is computationally infeasible.
Relinearization attack
One of the reasons for the insecurities of some additive knapsack-type cryptosystems is that these systems are basically linear, as observed in [18] . In our cryptosystem, the encryption function (7) is nonlinear about the plaintext vector. Of course, the attacker can obtain a linear function just by setting
The lattice basis reduction algorithms are always used to find a ''small'' solution to a linear equation. Naturally, the attacker views (12) as a compact knapsack problem and then launches a low-density subset-sum attack. However, (12) is not a standard compact knapsack problem. In fact, when he launches a low-density subset-sum attack, the problem that the attacker wants to solve is the following standard compact knapsack problem Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama [25] schemes. In their schemes, the big space is {0, 1} n , while the small space consists of those vectors whose Hamming weight is exactly h.
In the sequel, we begin to show the infeasibility of solving the compact knapsack problem (13) for the plaintext by using lattice reduction algorithms.
Evaluation of density
Now we begin to investigate the effects of the powerful low-density attacks on the security of the proposed system. When applied to a specific knapsack instance, the low-density attacks depend on the density of the knapsack. If we adopt the definition given in [32] , we can estimate the density of (13) When n = 100, the density of (13) is about 1.27, which is sufficiently high. Now we cannot claim the security of the cryptosystem against the low-density subset-sum attacks due to the following considers. Firstly, no general results are obtained for low-density attacks on compact knapsack problems. We note that Coster et al.'s bound 0.9408 [17] only applies to 0-1 knapsack problems, and Lee and Park's attack applies to compact knapsacks with b = log 2 (k+1) much larger than n and density d < 1 [32] . All these things say nothing about the compact knapsack problem (13). So we cannot conclude that the proposed knapsack cryptosystem is secure only by observing that [25] were shown also vulnerable to low-density attacks [26] [27] [28] [29] . The success of the low-density subset-sum algorithms in attacking the Chor-Rivest and Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama cryptosystems depends on the fact that the two schemes choose low-weight vectors as the valid plaintext vectors. To claim the security of the proposed cryptosystem against low-density subset-sum attacks, we need to establish a stronger security argument.
Non-injectivity
The basic idea of low-density subset-sum and hence low-weight attacks is to find one [26, 27] or polynomially many [28] n-dimensional spheres covering the solution candidates. The success of low-weight attacks depends on the fact that we can use a ''small'' sphere to cover a lattice point. In our cryptosystem, we should note that (13) always has many (denote the number of solutions as t) solutions and the unique solution to (12) is not necessarily the shortest vector no matter what norms are used. The only difference between the solution (y 1 , . . . , y n ) of (12) and other solutions of (13) is that every y i is a square. However, the lattice basis reduction algorithms, say the LLL algorithm [30] , only considers the size of the entries of a vector. Hence, the special structure of y i ∈ I cannot be used by the lattice reduction algorithms. So we can assume that the lattice reduction algorithms just find a random vector in the t solutions. In real life practice, the practical lattice reduction algorithms always can serve as a lattice oracle to output a shortest vector of a low-dimensional lattice. See [26] [27] [28] . In fact, when d > 1, the compact knapsack problem (13) has many solutions, i.e., the function (13) about Y is non-injective. It may be a difficult task to estimate the lower bound for the number of the solutions that (13) has. The authors only find the estimations of the upper bound in [26] . Generally speaking, the number t is the ratio of the cardinality of the set Z The number t exponentially increases in n. When n = 100, t ≈ 2 151 . So the encryption function is non-injective under the relinearization attack model. Hence, the low-density subset-sum attack can find the valid plaintext only with a nonnegligible probability 1/t ≈ 1/2 151 when n = 100. To summarize, we assume that the low-density subset-sum attack can find a solution to (13) and that
is uniformly distributed over all the t solutions to (13) . Hence, the attacker succeeds to obtain Y M with a probability P = 1/t. We showed that t exponentially increases with n. Therefore the probability P = 1/t is a negligible function about n.
When discussing the low-weight attacks, we do not prevent the reduction from solving (13) to the shortest vector problem over a lattice. However, we want to point out a fact about the low-weight cryptosystems and our cryptosystem. In a low-weight cryptosystem, the lattice point covered by a sphere, i.e., the shortest vector, is always the unique plaintext. In our cryptosystem, any sphere covering the plaintext lattice point always covers exponentially many solutions to (13) . It may be possible to find polynomially many solutions to (13) . But it is highly impractical to enumerate all of these solutions, let alone to find them.
An example
The discussion in Section 6.2.2 shows that even if a lattice oracle is available and the attacker can find a solution to the compact knapsack problem (13), the probability is still negligible. Now we use a small example to illustrate the noninjectivity of the knapsack cryptosystem. The parameters are given in Table 1 .
In the example, we use Matlab to find that the compact knapsack problem, c = 9 i=1 f i y i with 0 ≤ y i ≤ 225, has t = 486 solutions in total, which are not listed in Table 1 for space limitations. Hence, if a low-density attack can output a random solution among the 486 solutions, the attacker will succeed with a probability 1/486. We also note that M = (3, 7, 15, 8, 6, 9, 11, 13, 10) , and that Y M = (9, 49, 225, 64, 36, 81, 121, 169, 100) 
Diophantine approximation attack
If the attacker obtains N and v −1 mod N, and then factors N = pq, he can break the cryptosystem. Now, we consider some known attacks to recover the modulus and the multiplier. Some knapsack cryptosystems use size conditions to disguise an easy knapsack problem. In such a cryptosystem, every
, the modulus is m, and the multiplier is w such that gcd(m, w) = 1. An easy knapsack vector (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is disguised as a seemingly hard knapsack sequence B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) by using the size condition m > (2
and a modular multiplication b i = wa i (mod m). The size condition can be utilized by the simultaneous Diophantine approximation attack to obtain some useful information about (w, m). See [19, 20] for more information about the relation between the simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem and cryptanalytics. Another Diophantine approximation attack due to Lagarias [19] also uses the size conditions to recover some information about the modulus and the multiplier.
The trapdoor of the proposed system is disguised using the Chinese remainder theorem, which involves no size conditions. The attacker cannot expect finding some information about the trapdoor by launching a simultaneous Diophantine approximation attack. So the proposed cryptosystem is also invulnerable to Lagarias' attack. However, the reader may doubt that the size conditions p > n i=1â i and q > n i=1b i have been used. We should observe that if the attacker wants to launch a simultaneous Diophantine approximation attack, he must peel off the outmost shuffles (5) and (6) . We will show that this is also a difficult task.
We also point out that Shamir's attack [36] on the basic Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem [1] does not apply to our cryptosystem, either. This is because the basic Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem is constructed by using a super-increasing knapsack sequence and a size condition, while the public cargo vector of the proposed cryptosystem is not constructed from a super-increasing knapsack sequence.
Orthogonal lattice attack
Another powerful key-recovery attack on knapsack cryptosystem is orthogonal lattice attack [21] . The crucial observation is that the attacked cryptosystem uses smooth numbers in the secret cargo vector. That is, the entries of the secret cargo vector only have small factors. The proposed cryptosystem uses two cargo vectors A and B with some special structures, that is, the entries of A and B only have small factors. However, we should note that the cargo vectors A and B are scrambled by a matrix C . After the multiplication, Â ,B T = C (A, B) T , it is highly impossible that all the entries ofÂ andB still only have small factors. Hence, the orthogonal lattice attack seems infeasible.
Known N attack
We assume that the exact value of N is known by the attacker. It is straightforward for the attacker to search for v −1 mod N and then factor N to recover the trapdoor information. We note that anyone can do exhaustively search for the matrix C . According to Algorithm 2, the only distinction between the generated a i , b i and a random integer with the same binary length is: when i is small enough, the generated a i , b i just contain small prime factors, while a random integer may not be. However, after the two shuffles (5) and (6), the generated vector F will be indistinguishable from a randomly chosen n-dimensional vectors over Z N . Hence, the attacker will learn little information about a i and b i from the public cargo vector F and without factoring N. In fact the best way for the attacker to retrieve the trapdoor seems to factor N at first and then recover the secret vectors A and B.
However, we show that the modulus N = pq must be kept secret. Otherwise, the attacker can factor N = pq and then break the system. Note that |N| 2 = |225 2 n 2 60.86 n−1 | 2 ≈ 616 bits when n = 100. Hence, it may not be difficult enough for the attacker to factor the modulus N.
Known p and q attack
Now we consider such a scenario that the attacker has factorized the modulus N = pq. 
